Specify Of Books The Possibility of Altruism
Title | : | The Possibility of Altruism |
Author | : | Thomas Nagel |
Book Format | : | Paperback |
Book Edition | : | First Edition |
Pages | : | Pages: 158 pages |
Published | : | March 1st 1979 by Princeton University Press (Princeton, NJ) (first published January 1st 1970) |
Categories | : | Philosophy. Politics. Psychology. Nonfiction |

Thomas Nagel
Paperback | Pages: 158 pages Rating: 3.78 | 129 Users | 7 Reviews
Description Conducive To Books The Possibility of Altruism
Thomas Nagel visited Loyola University during my first semester there while taking David Ozar's Survey Ethics course. Naturally, most of us from class attended his lecture up in the scenic Hussey Lounge atop Damen Hall. He was not a particularly good speaker. It was my first visit to the lounge and I must admit to being distracted by the lovely panorama of the Loop to the south and the Lake to the east.The book was better, though I have trouble understanding why there is a controversy about the idea of altrustic behavior--enough that Professor Nagle has devoted much of his career to arguing on the pro side of it.
It is a commonplace in evolutionary biology and psychology to distinguish between individual- and species-survival drives. Indeed, the sociobiology fad of the time was substantially based upon the biological evidence. One can, of course, reduce such species-survival drives as our caring for children to a kind of genetic selfishness, but that is perspectival and does not change the fact that we are often motivated in the interests of other individuals.
It seems to me that a fruitful approach to the "problem" is to question the whole self/other distinction, recognizing that the senses of agency/responsibility/selfhood vary between cultures and eras. To take a familiar example of this, consider the many cases in the bible of a member of a family/clan/nation performing an act which the entire collective is identified with--sometimes on to many generations. Consider, for instance, the doctrine of original sin, that "in Adam's fall, so fell we all", as well as that of our redemption through the efficacy of Jesus' sacrifice millenia ago.
From another angle, consider the psychological commonplace of questioning the integrity of the person as agent. Instead, the "person" is regarded as a kind of shorthand reference to an individual body, while the "personality" is regarded as being made up of more-or-less associated complexes. Our culture favors well-integrated complexes of course, the association of bodies with ethical agents being convenient, but recognizes that this is a fiction insofar as, say, law makes exception for "crimes of passion", religions (and the arts) honor certain states of possession, and psychotherapy profits off of various modes of disintegration and maladjustment.
Rather than questioning altruism, why not question the notion of selfishness? What is the "self" anyway? Our culture has a tendency to think of it as being somehow foundationally atomic, individual in the sense of being indivisible. But it might just as well be seen as an ever-changing compromise formation which may, for a time, under certain pressures, appear as solid as a diamond, but which certainly has not the gem's perdurance. Just as our ever-changing bodies ultimately decompose entirely, so too, and often much more suddenly, do our selves. Indeed, bodies occasionally last longer than selves.
Furthermore, the notion of having a unique self or soul does not stand up to analysis. What would constitute such uniqueness? Our private thoughts and memories perhaps? But how do we apprehend this inner, private life of our selves? I do it entirely in terms of the most common, public semiotic and symbolic forms. I know myself in terms of language, very broadly defined, and the languages used are ones taught me by others, understandable to others. Indeed, I know "myself" as an other. Indeed, and this is important, there is a real sense in which "altruism" to oneself is as vitally problematic as altruism to others. Masochism, self-destructiveness in many forms, are common phenomena if not universal.
Declare Books Concering The Possibility of Altruism
Original Title: | The Possibility of Altruism |
ISBN: | 0691020027 (ISBN13: 9780691020020) |
Edition Language: | English URL http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/object/thomasnagel |
Rating Of Books The Possibility of Altruism
Ratings: 3.78 From 129 Users | 7 ReviewsAssess Of Books The Possibility of Altruism
Thomas Nagel visited Loyola University during my first semester there while taking David Ozar's Survey Ethics course. Naturally, most of us from class attended his lecture up in the scenic Hussey Lounge atop Damen Hall. He was not a particularly good speaker. It was my first visit to the lounge and I must admit to being distracted by the lovely panorama of the Loop to the south and the Lake to the east.The book was better, though I have trouble understanding why there is a controversy about theI wanted to write a brief review on this book, because there doesn't seem to be any other one's besides Erik's. Unfortunately, I find his review irrelevant, and misguided. I don't mean that as disrespectful, but towards the end ranting about what the 'self" is, well, it's quite frankly irrelevant to this particular book. And I think there are some misunderstandings about the book (although, I could be wrong, because it doesn't appear his review says much at all about the book itself).First, the
While absolutely intriguing, the Possibility of Altruism, is a seriously academically challenging read. I hope to get through more of it, but am afraid this may continue to be a task I am not yet ready for.

Thomas Nagel is an American philosopher, currently University Professor and Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. His main areas of philosophical interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics. He is well-known for his critique of reductionist accounts of the mind in his essay "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), and for hisThomas Nagel visited Loyola University during my first semester there while taking David Ozar's Survey Ethics course. Naturally, most of us from class attended his lecture up in the scenic Hussey Lounge atop Damen Hall. He was not a particularly good speaker. It was my first visit to the lounge and I must admit to being distracted by the lovely panorama of the Loop to the south and the Lake to the east.The book was better, though I have trouble understanding why there is a controversy about the
Nagel Is Not My BagelI wanted to like this book. I really wanted to be convinced that rationality itself can provide people with reasons to be altruistic (funnily enough, the exact opposite of Ayn Rand's thesis). But such a position requires the impossible: the existence of objective value.Nagel writes carefully and thoroughly on this subject, and some parts of his argument are quite interesting and made this book worth reading. He offers a modification of the "veil of ignorance" that asks
I'd honestly give this 3.5 stars if I could. I guess I decided to "round up" to 4. This book offers some very striking arguments against moral skepticism. They are common sense and ultimately persuasive. However, they are presented in the most abstract way possible---few examples and little to no interaction with the voluminous relevant literature. I usually find Nagel's writing to be lively and engaging, but this book is like eating a dry cracker when thirsty. The conclusion chapter could
By contrasting with the notion of prudence, Nagel effectively argues for the possibility of objective moral motivation. Similar to the way we view our future selves as one of several person stages that constitutes a person, we can view ourselves as one amongst many --leading us to make judgments such as "It is wrong to rape a child for any person." Such insight, perhaps the most important one in this book, that follows even in his later works is the notion of impersonal judgment. Much of this
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